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RECENT DECISIONS
which obtained jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter.' 2 The
question when jurisdiction will be exercised is often one of great
delicacy,13 as a conflict of jurisdiction may result by the local court's
interference. The power, therefore, is used sparingly,14 especially,
when the foreign court can do as complete justice as the domestic
court.1 The plaintiff has the burden of showing equitable grounds
for relief.' 6
In seeking an injunction, it seems that the subject matter 17 and
location of the court ' 8 where the cause of action is pending, is imma-
terial when there is jurisdiction in persoanmm. The purpose of the
suit in the foreign jurisdiction and the ends to be attained, however,
are of prime importance.
The denial of the injunction was justified because the instant case
falls within the general rule that no injunction will be granted unless
a clear equity is made out. It does not appear that the foreign suit
was fraudulent, instituted in bad faith, or was an attempt to evade
New York law.' 9  The power of the court to grant such relief in such
a case is purely discretionary, and mere convenience is not of suffi-
cient importance to influence the court.
B. R.
EVIDENCE-WIRE TAPPING-FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS AcT
NOT APPLICABLE TO INTRASTATE COMMUNICATIONS.-The defen-
dants were convicted of using the mails' in furtherance of a con-
12 Royal League v. Kavanagh, 233 Ill. 175, 84 N. E. 178 (1908); Illinois
Life Ins. Co. v. Prentiss, 277 Ill. 383, 115 N. E. 554 (1917).
13 Notes (1928) 57 A. L. R. 77; (1932) 31 MIcE. L. REv. 88.
14 Jones v. Hughes, 156 Iowa 684, 137 N. W. 1023 (1912) ; Bigelow v. Old
Dominion Co., 74 N. J. Eq. 457, 71 At. 153 (1908); Carpenter v. Hanes, 162
N. C. 46, 77 S. E. 1101 (1913). -
"5 Harris v. Pullman, 84 Ill. 20 (1876) ; Edgell v. Clarke, 19 App. Div. 199,
45 N. Y. Supp. 979 (1st Dept. 1897).
16 Carson v. Dunham, 149 Mass. 52, 20 N. E. 312 (1889); Freick v.
Hinkley, 122 Minn. 24, 141 N. W. 1096 (1913) ; Wyeth Hardware Co. v. Lang,
54 Mo. App. 147 (1893), affd, 127 Mo. 242, 29 S. W. 1010 (1895) ; Bennet v.
LeRoy, 13 N. Y. Super. Ct. 683 (1857); Hymen v. Helm, 24 Ch. D. 531,
49 L. T. R. (N. s.) 376 (1883).
17 Phelps v. McDonald, 99 U. S. 298 (1878); Williams v. Williams, 83
Misc. 560, 145 N. Y. Supp. 564 (1913); Mead v. Merritt, 2 Paige 402 (N. Y.
1831).
Is Gage v. Riverside Trust Co., 86 Fed. 984 (D. C. Cal. 1898) ; Field v.
Holbrook, 3 Abb. Pr. 377 (N. Y. 1856); Dainese v. Allen, 3 Abb. Pr. (N. s.)
212 (N. Y. 1867); Carron Iron Co. v. McCaren, 5 H. L. C. 416, 10 Eng. Rep.
961 (1855).
19 From a study of appellant's brief the above factors do not appear, as
defendant contends that the breach of contract giving rise to the suit took place
in England where all their important witnesses reside, and the cause of action
was brought there in good faith.
135 STAT. 1130 (1909), 18 U. S. C. § 338 (1934).
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spiracy 2 to defraud. The trial court admitted evidence obtained by
federal agents by means of wire tapping. An appeal was taken to the
Circuit Court of Appeals on the ground that this admission consti-
tuted reversible error. Held, affirmed. The use of intrastate com-
munications obtained by wire tapping as evidence, is not prohibited by
Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act.3 That section
applies only to the inadmissibility of interstate communications
obtained by federal agents by tapping wires.4  United States v. Weiss,
103 F. (2d) 348 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
The general rule at common law, is that evidence illegally ob-
tained, but otherwise competent, is admissible,5 provided no right
granted by the Federal Constitution or a federal statute is violated in
the procurement of such evidence. Wire tapping is not a violation of
the Fourth Amendment 6 to the United States Constitution, nor is the
use of evidence so obtained a violation of the Fifth Amendment. 7
This rule was laid down in the case of Olmstead v. United States,8
where the Court, in a 5 to 4 decision,9 held that the interception of
telephone messages by wire tapping was not an "illegal search and
seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and that a
defendant, against whom evidence had been obtained by such means,
was not compelled to be a witness against himself within the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment.
The question remains as to whether the introduction of intrastate
communication obtained by federal agents by wire tapping as evi-
dence, is a violation of Section 605 of the Federal Communications
Act. The pertinent portion of the section provides that "no person
not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication
and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport,
effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person
* * * and no person having received such intercepted communication
or having become acquainted with the contents, substance, purport,
effect or meaning of the same or any part thereof, knowing that such
information was so obtained, shall divulge or publish the existence,
contents, substance, purport, effect or meaning of the same or any part
thereof * * *." The conviction, in the instant case, was affirmed upon
the proposition that these provisions do not apply to intrastate com-
munications. In this construction of the section, the Court followed
235 STAT. 1096 (1909), 18 U. S. C. §88 (1934).
348 STAT. 1103, 47 U. S. C. §605 (1934).
4 Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S. 379, 58 Sup. Ct. 275 (1937).
5 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) 2183.
6 U. S. CoNsT. Amend. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated * * *"
7 U. S. CONST. Amend. V. "No person *** shall be compelled, in any
criminal case, to be a witness against himself".
8277 U. S. 438, 48 Sup. Ct. 564 (1928).
9 The unusually strong dissent found in this case indicates a possibility that
this decision may be overruled.
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the interpretation of the First Circuit Court.' 0 However, there are
contrary decisions in the Sixth' 1 and Third 12 Circuits. In those
Circuits, the courts were of the opinion that Congress intended Section
605 to be remedial and, therefore, to be liberally construed. They be-
lieved that Congress was engaged in solving an ethical problem, and
that such problem would not be solved if only interstate communica-
tions, obtained by wire tapping, were rendered inadmissible as evi-
dence. In view of the fact that the circuit courts are not in accord as
to the construction to be given to Section 605, the question whether
the introduction of intrastate communications obtained by federal
agents by tapping wires is a violation of Section 605 remains an open
one.
It may be contended that the construction placed upon the statute
by the Court in the instant case was erroneous. This follows from a
consideration of the statute. It will be noted that Section 605 is
divided into four subdivisions. The first and third subdivisions pro-
hibit the unauthorized divulging or use of any "interstate or foreign
communication". The second and fourth subdivisions pertain to the
interception of messages. They prohibit the interception of "any com-
munication",' 3 and the divulging and use of such intercepted com-
munication. The latter provisions, which are the provisions here
involved, may, in the absence of all words of limitation, be construed
as applying to all communications, intrastate as well as interstate and
foreign. The argument that the basic object of the Act is to protect
and regulate interstate and foreign communications,'14 may be met by
the argument that the wire-tapping provisions of Section 605 are not
regulatory provisions and, consequently, have no bearing upon the
construction of that section.' 5
The issue at present seems to rest upon an interpretation of
Nardone v. United States.'6 In Valli v. United States, the Court
10 Valli v. United States, 94 F. (2d) 687 (C. C. A. 1st, 1938). Accord:
United States v. Bonanzi, 94 F. (2d) 570 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938); United States
v. Bernava, 95 F. (2d) 310 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
11 Diamond v. United States, 94 F. (2d) 1012 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938).
12 Sablowsky v. United States, 101 F. (2d) 183 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938).
13 Nigro v. United States, 276 U. S. 332, 48 Sup. Ct. 388 (1928) (the
natural meaning of "any" was defined as including "all").
14 48 STAT. 1064, 47 U. S. C. § 1152 (1934) : "The provisions of this chapter
shall apply to all interstate and foreign communications by wire * * *"
15 Sablowsky v. United States, 101 F. (2d) 183, 189 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938)
("It will be noted that the provisions of section 605 are very different in their
nature from those of the other sections of the Communications Act. * * * upon
the other hand the provisions of the second and fourth clauses of section 605,
which upon their face purport to relate to all persons do not relate to the
regulation of communication carriers and therefore constitute a rule of evidence
in the purest sense").
16 Defendants were convicted of violating the Anti-Smuggling Act and of
conspiracy. At the trial federal agents testified to interstate communications
intercepted by wire tapping. The Court, relying on the "clear language" of
1939]
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construed the Nardone case as setting forth the rule that Section 605
of the Federal Communications Act applies only to interstate com-
munications intercepted by government agents by tapping wires, and,
therefore, intrastate communications obtained in the same way are
admissible as evidence. The instant case is in accordance with the
decision in Valli v. United States, but is opposed to the decision in
the Sablowsky case.17
It is true that Congress has power to prohibit federal agents from
divulging intrastate wire communications in district courts of the
United States. Congress may impose legislation affecting intrastate
commerce whenever it is necessary as a means of exercising control of
interstate and foreign commerce.:' Whether Congress embodied such
an intention in Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act,
remains unsettled.
The instant case is now before the Supreme Court of the United
States on a writ of certiorari to decide the conflict which has arisen
among the various circuit courts of appeal in construing Section 605
of the Federal Communications Act.
M. B.
INTERSTATE MOTOR CARRIERS-STATE REGULATION-BURDEN
ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE-VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE OF CONSTITUTION.-For the collection of a tax on one of
defendant's trucks, pursuant to the Georgia Maintenance Tax Act,'
plaintiff obtained an execution and levied upon that vehicle. Defen-
dant, a common carrier for hire engaged exclusively in interstate
transportation by motor vehicle, is authorized by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission to use the state highway system, 2 but such author-
ization does not extend to the use of the rural post roads. The Geor-
gia Act directs that the tax money be used for the maintenance of the
§ 605, decided that federal agents were included thereunder and that interstate
communications obtained by wire tapping were inadmissible as evidence.
17 The Court in this case interpreted the Nardrne case as creating a rule
of evidence excluding federal agents from divulging intercepted wire com-
munications. They contended that such a rule of exclusion should apply to
federal agents in regard to intercepted intrastate communications.
Is Southern Ry. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20, 32 Sup. Ct. 2 (1911).
1Ga. Laws 1937, pp. 155-167. The Act requires that all who own or have
exclusive right to use for more than 30 days a motor bus, truck, or trailer
"shall pay a maintenance tax for the operation *** upon and over the public
roads of this State".
2 MOTOR CARRIER AcT, 49 STAT. 55 (1935), 49 U. S. C. A. § 301 (Supp.
1938). Evidently federal regulation under the Act is not adequate, for the
court interpreted subsection (c) of Section 302 as preserving both the right of
a state to regulate traffic on the highways as an incident of its police power,
and the right of taxation to conserve its highways. Lowe v. Stoutamire, 123
Fla. 135, 166 So. 310 (1936).
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